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Abstract: This paper is a comparative study of the responses to the 1995 Wharton School
survey of derivative usage among US non-financial firms and a 1997 companion survey on
German non-financial firms.  It is not a mere comparison of the results of both studies but a
comparative study, drawing a comparable subsample of firms from the US study to match
the sample of German firms on both size and industry composition.  We find that German
firms are more likely to use derivatives than US firms, with 78% of German firms using
derivatives compared to 57% of US firms.  Aside from this higher overall usage, the general
pattern of usage across industry and size groupings is comparable across the two countries.
In both countries, foreign currency derivative usage is most common, followed closely by
interest rate derivatives, with commodity derivatives a distant third.  Usage rates across all
three classes of derivatives are higher for German firms than US firms.  In contrast to the
similarities, firms in the two countries differ notably on issues such as the primary goal of
hedging, their choice of instruments, and the influence of their market view when taking
derivative positions. These differences appear to be driven by the greater importance of
financial accounting statements in Germany than the US and stricter German corporate
policies of control over derivative activities within the firm. German firms also indicate
significantly less concern about derivative related issues than US firms, which appears to
arise from a more basic and simple strategy for using derivatives.  Finally, among the
derivative non-users, German firms tend to cite reasons suggesting derivatives were not
needed whereas US firms tend to cite reasons suggesting a possible role for derivatives, but
a hesitation to use them for some reason.
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I. Introduction
One undeniable characteristic of the past few decades is greater concern with the volatility in
foreign exchange rates, interest rates, market prices for securities, and commodity prices than in
previous decades.  These fluctuations in financial prices can have significant effects on the fortunes
of companies.  For example, large scale changes in exchange rates have lead to dramatic changes
in the competitive structure of markets that have caused companies to be nearly driven out of
markets where they formerly held comfortable market shares.  Well known examples are the US
firms Caterpillar and Kodak or the experiences of the German car producers Volkswagen
1 and
Porsche on the US market.  Often times, management became aware of the importance of these
price risks for the financial results of companies only after incurring significant losses.
Previously, shareholders and stakeholders accepted explanations that unfavorable and
unforeseeable movements of prices not under the control of management resulted in poor financial
results.  Nowadays, they increasingly expect management to be able to identify and manage
exposures to such market risks.  The task of managing these risks has been facilitated by the
increasing availability of a variety of instruments to transfer financial price risks to other parties.
In particular, markets for derivative instruments such as forwards and futures, swaps and options,
and innovative combinations of these building blocks of financial instruments have developed and
grown at a breathtaking pace in the past few decades.
While companies have been using derivatives for many years, little has been known about
the extent or pattern of their use because firms have not been required (until recently in the US, at
least) to publicly report their derivatives activity.  Unfortunately, the use of derivatives by
companies only appears to receive attention in response to special cases of huge derivative related
losses such as Barings, Procter&Gamble or Metallgesellschaft.
2  The normal beneficial use of
derivative instruments in the daily risk management activities of companies receives much less
attention in the financial press.  As a result, relatively little is known about the patterns of use or
firms’ attitudes and policies regarding derivative use.
                                               
1  See Srinivasulu (1981) p. 13-23.
2  See Po (1997), p. 41-55 for a report on derivative disasters.2
Recently, however, there have been several studies on the use of derivatives by US non-
financial companies.  Among these are the surveys of the Treasury Management Association
(1996), Greenwich Associates (1996), and especially two large-scale surveys conducted by the
Wharton School: one in 1994 (Bodnar, Hayt, Marston, and Smithson (1995)) and another in late
1995 (Bodnar, Hayt, and Marston (1996)).  These studies have provided some insight into the use
of derivatives for risk management and other purposes as well as reporting and control issues for
US non-financial firms.
There have also recently been some studies on the use of derivatives by non-US companies.
For example, Downie, McMillan, and Nosal (1996) survey Canadian firms, Yanagida and Inui
(1995) survey Japanese firms, and Price Waterhouse (1995) surveys a set of large international
firms on derivative usage and related issues.  Given these studies of derivative usage in different
countries, an interesting direction for further study is cross-country comparisons of the patterns of
and attitudes towards derivatives usage.  However, careful comparison across surveys is typically
hampered by the lack of comparability of the survey design and questions.
Anticipating this problem, the Downie, McMillan and Nosal (1996) survey of Canadian
firms was structured to ask question similar to those of the Wharton surveys of US firms.  The
responses of the Canadian firms were quite similar to those of the US firms limiting the
informativeness of a comparative study.  Most likely, the similarity in results is due to the
geographical and cultural proximity of Canada to the US as well as the similarities in the structure
of the corporate sector.  From the perspective of a cross-country study, a more interesting case
would be to contrast US firms to those of another economically significant country where
industrial structure and corporate culture are not as similar.  With this is mind, a study of
derivatives usage of German non-financial companies was conducted by Gebhardt and Russ
(1998).  It was designed as a parallel study to the 1995 Wharton survey in order to allow direct
comparison with the US results.
This paper reports on a comparison of the US and German firms use of and attitudes
towards derivatives from the responses to this German survey and the 1995 Wharton survey.  It is
not a mere comparison of the results of both studies but a comparative study.  It draws the
comparable subsample of firms from the US study to match the sample of German firms on both3
size and industry composition.  The comparability of the questions as well as the firms responding
allows us to draw relatively clean comparisons of the firms’ uses of and attitudes towards
derivatives.
The analysis of the survey responses suggests that German firms are more likely to use
derivatives than US firms.  This is true across all three classes of derivatives examined: foreign
exchange (FX), interest rate (IR), and commodity price (CM).  However, controlling for this
country effect, the general pattern of usage across industry and size is very comparable, suggesting
that the general tendency to use derivatives is driven by economic issues such as operational
activities and firm characteristics.  While firms in both countries overwhelmingly indicate that they
use derivatives mostly for risk management, differences appear in the primary goal of using
derivatives, with German firms focusing more on managing accounting results whereas US firms
focused more on managing cash flows.  German firms are more likely to incorporate their own
market view on price movement when taking positions with derivatives than US firms.  Despite
this, German firms are also more relaxed about derivatives, indicating a significantly lower level of
concern about issues related to derivatives than US firms.  This attitude is consistent with the
German firms’ consistently stricter attitudes and policies towards controlling derivatives activities
within the firm.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section discusses the samples
for each survey and reports on the overall use and non-use of derivatives.  Section III compares
the responses to detailed questions regarding derivative use and attitudes towards derivatives in
each country.  Sections IV, V, and VI compare derivative usage across the two countries in the
areas of foreign exchange, interest rates and commodities, respectively.  Section VII examines
responses to question on corporate policies on control and reporting for derivatives, and Section
VIII concludes.4
II.  Comparative Sample Selection and Overall Usage or Non-Usage
A. Comparative Sample Selection
This comparative study is based on the questionnaire of 1995 Wharton Survey of US non-
financial firms that was used with only minor modifications in the 1997 German study.  The US
questionnaire was sent out to a broad-based sample of 2000 US companies including all Fortune
500 firms in the fall of 1995.  Three hundred and fifty firms responded to the questionnaire.  The
German questionnaire was sent to 368 firms comprising large private firms and quoted companies
with an annual turnover of DM 200 million or more with the exception of regional breweries,
regional public utilities, and local public transportation companies.  The German questionnaire was
sent in the spring of 1997 and 126 firms responded.
To make these two samples more directly comparable in terms of firm size, we dropped 150
US respondents with sales below $133.3 million (DM200 million assuming DM/$ = 1.5).  In
addition, to improve the matching on the industry structure side, we eliminated three US
companies in the gold mining industry, as there are no comparable companies in Germany.  This
created a group of US firms that are structurally comparable to the German respondents from
which the responses to the questionnaires will be compared.
The Total columns in Table 1 show a breakdown by six size groups (measured by sales) of
the 197 remaining respondents to the US questionnaire and the 126 respondents to the German
questionnaire.  The breakdown indicates that the percentages of responding companies are higher
for the German companies in the larger size groups and higher for the US companies with the
smaller size groups.  For the top three size groups, the absolute numbers of responding companies
are close for both surveys.5
Table 1: Use of Derivatives - by Size
USA Germany
 Sales Groups Num
(% of Total)
Yes
(% of Num)
No
(% of Num)
Total
(% of Total)
Yes
(% of Num)
No
(% of Num)
 > DM10b 30 27 3 36 27 9
 (> $ 6.66b) 15.2% 90.0% 10.0% 28.6% 75.0% 25.0%
 DM5b - DM10b 24 19 5 18 17 1
 ($6.66b - $3.33b) 12.2% 72.9% 20.8% 14.3% 94.4% 5.6%
 DM2,5b -DM5b 28 16 12 24 21 3
 ($3.33 b - $1.67b) 14.2% 57.1% 42.9% 19.0% 87.5% 12.5%
 DM1b - DM2,5b 45 29 16 25 21 4
 ($1.67b - $0.66b) 22.8% 64.4% 35.6% 19.8% 84.0% 16.0%
 DM0,5b - DM1b 32 14 18 11 6 5
 ($0.66b - $0.33b) 16.2% 43.8% 56.3% 8.7% 54.5% 45.5%
 < DM0,5b 38 7 31 12 6 6
 (< $0.33b) 19.3% 18.4% 81.6% 9.5% 50.0% 50.0%
  Total 197 112 85 126 98 28
56.9% 43.1% 77.8% 22.2%
Figure 1 splits the responding companies by industry groups with the total number of firms
in each group shown on the right-hand side of the figure.  Industry classification is based on the
official classification index of the European Community NACE and comparable US SIC code
groups.
3  To deal with industrially diversified firms, companies active in more than one industry
group were assigned to up to three industry-groups based on their three most-important industry
activities that each constitutes 10% of total sales.  Thus the sum of industry classifications exceeds
the number of responding firms (US industry classifications: 240; German industry classifications:
166).  The absolute numbers of respondents are very close in five of the eleven industry groups.
Major differences in subgroup composition show up only in the service industry and with utilities
where the numbers of US companies are considerably larger.
                                               
3  The correspondence between NACE and SIC codes is as follows: Mining = SIC 10 (excluding gold mining), 12,
13, 14; Construction = SIC codes 15 – 17; Consumer = SIC codes 20-25, 27, 31, and 39; Chemicals = SIC
codes 28 – 30; Metals = SIC codes 33 and 34; Machinery = SIC codes 35 (except 357 computers); Electro = SIC
codes 357, 36, and 38; Motor Vehicles = SIC codes 37; Services = SIC codes 40-42, 44-45, 47, 48, and 70-88;
Utilities = SIC codes 46 and 49; and Retail = SIC codes 50-59.6
B. Derivatives Usage and Non-usage by Size and Industry
The overall results on derivative usage are displayed in Table 1.  The first result to note is
that the percentage of responding companies using derivatives is larger for the German companies
(77.8%) than for US companies (56.9%).  This result is consistent over all size groups with the
exception of the largest group of companies where the percentage of US companies using
derivatives is higher.  The second result to note is that common to both countries, the percentage
of firms using derivatives increases with firm size.  Again the exception to this pattern is the
largest group of German firms which are less likely to use derivatives than the next three smaller
groups of German firms.  A closer look at the largest German firms reveals that four of the nine
non-derivative users are subsidiaries of foreign groups that reported in additional comments that
they were integrated in the central risk management of the group.  Another four non-users belong
to the construction and retail industries where derivatives use is less common.  The result that
derivative usage increases with firm size, although not predicted by earlier positive theories of
hedging (see, e.g., Smith and Stulz (1984)), is consistent with other empirical evidence and is
suggestive of a significant fixed cost to a firm’s hedging program.  The fixed costs of the hedging
program make derivative usage uneconomical for small firms despite potentially larger benefits.
Thus, larger firms for whom the fixed costs can be spread out across a greater number of
transactions are more likely to use derivatives.
Figure 1 indicates that the result of German companies being more prone to use derivatives
is also consistent across industries groups, with only one exception (the mining industry).  Again,
exception can be explained by the fact that many firms in the German mining industry are
subsidiaries of foreign groups.  For the chemical industry we observe a near tie on a high level of
derivatives usage in both countries.
One possible explanation for the greater propensity to use of derivatives on the part of
German firms is the different extent of exposure to the risks of international operations.  Typically,
international operations form a larger part of the activities of German companies as compared to
comparable US companies, which have the advantage of a much larger single-currency home
market.
4  For firms with similar economic characteristics, a greater exposure, and thus more
                                               
4  This will change with the introduction of the EURO as a single European currency by 1999.7
potential risk, would increase the incentive to use derivatives to manage the risk.  However, while
this would explain currency greater derivative use, as we shall see German firms are also more
likely to use interest rate and commodity price derivatives than US firms.
Figure 1 also demonstrates that the pattern of derivative use across industries is broadly
similar in both countries.  Companies in the construction, consumer goods retail, service (only in
the US) and utilities industry use derivatives to a smaller extent than companies in the chemical,
electro, machinery, or metals industry.  Companies in the first group of industries are typically
more focused on their national markets and thus less exposed to the price risks of international
operations (especially currency risk) than companies in the second group.  One might then expect
a higher percentage of derivative users in the German motors industry, which is well known to be
an industry following global strategies.  Again two of the non-using companies are subsidiaries of
foreign groups.  Of the six responding motor companies with German headquarters all use
derivatives.  This similarity in the pattern of derivative use across industries supports the view that
derivative usage is driven (at least partially) by underlying economic factors rather than random
choice.
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Figure 1 : Derivative Use by Industry8
Companies not using derivatives were asked to choose the most important reasons for non-
usage from a list of seven possibilities.  The most important argument cited by both US firms
(47.1%) and German firms (61.1%) is that the exposures are not large enough.  Next came the
statement that exposures could be managed using other means (e.g. home currency denomination
of export sales, operational strategies).  20.0% of the US and 16.7% of the German non-using
respondents listed this argument first.  Another important issue was concern over public
perceptions of derivative usage, cited as a reason for not using derivatives by 16.5% of US firm
and 11.1% of German firms.  10.6% of US firms cited lack of knowledge about derivatives as the
“most important” reason for not using derivatives whereas no German firm claimed this as a “most
important” explanation.  Instead 11.1% of German firms said that they did not use derivatives
because they perceived the costs of hedge to exceed the benefits while this view was shared by just
5.9% of US firms.  Difficulties in pricing derivatives and concerns about disclosure were cited as
reasons for not using derivatives by less than 10% of the firms in both countries.  Thus it appears
that in both countries, the primary reason for not using derivatives is that they are not needed (no
exposure).  Other German non-users tended to cite reasons suggesting that derivatives were not
needed, whereas other US non-users tended to cite reasons suggesting a possible role for
derivatives but a hesitation to use them for some reason.
III. Derivatives Usage
A. Areas of Use
Figure 2 reveals that US and German companies use derivatives primarily to manage foreign
exchange (FX) and interest rate (IR) risk.  Almost all German users, 95.9% employ derivatives in
FX management and 88.8% employ derivatives in IR management.  The comparable figures for
the US firms are once again smaller, 78.6% and 75.9%, respectively.  Considerable attention is
placed also on commodity price (CP) risks by US and German companies with around 40% of
firms in each country reporting usage.
5
                                               
5  The questionnaires further asked for the importance of equity price risk management, which turned out to be of
lesser importance both in the US and the German survey.  Therefore, we do not present results here. For the US
results see Bodnar/ Hayt/ Marston (1996), for the German results see Gebhardt/ Russ (1998).9
The smaller US involvement in FX derivatives arises mainly from companies in the utilities
(where 31.3% of US derivative users use FX derivatives versus 100% of German users), retail
(42.9% of versus 100%), and consumer goods, (66.7% versus 100%).  Lower levels of IR
derivatives use by US industries is found in the machinery (where 40.0% of US derivative users
use IR derivatives versus 94% of German users), consumer goods (58.3% versus 88%), retail
(64.3% versus 88%), and electro (66.7% versus 71%) industries.  For Germany, only the utilities
industry reports an exceptional low usage of IR derivatives (22.2% of German derivative users
compared to 94% of US derivative users).  Levels of CM derivatives usage are closer than the
other two, primarily because of the greater representation in the US sample of utilities and mining
firms, which are the activities most likely to use CM derivatives.
Most companies manage more than one price risk using derivatives.  This is especially true
of the German users, with 44.9% using derivatives in all three classes (FX, IR and CP), and 84.7%
using the combination of FX and IR derivatives.  The comparable number of US firms is 26.7%
for all three classes and 58.0% for FX and IR.  There are a few US firms, but no German ones,
which use only CP derivatives.
Beyond the data given in Figure 2, we observed the use of IR derivatives and CP derivatives
increasing with size in the German sample whereas there is no such pattern in the US sample.
Surprisingly the use of CP derivatives decreases with the size of US companies.
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Exchange Rates
Interest Rates
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Figure 2: Derivative Use Across Risk Classes10
B. Goals of Derivatives Usage
The most important role for derivatives is for risk management, and an important issue in
risk management is defining its goals.  The theoretical financial literature strongly recommends
focusing on cash flows or on the value of the company.  A focus on accounting numbers is
generally discarded.
6  However, the results in Table 2 reveal that managers are also concerned
with accounting numbers and use earnings and/or balance sheet accounts (especially equity) as
objectives in risk management.
The responses to the primary goal of using derivatives in risk management are different for
US and German firms.  A relative majority of US companies (48.6%) focus their use of derivatives
in risk management primarily on minimizing the variability in cash flow with minimizing variability
in accounting earnings (44.0%) coming in a close second.  However, only 5.5% of the US
companies think of minimizing the variability of accounting earnings as not being an important
hedging objective.
A striking absolute majority (55.3%) of German companies chose minimizing variability in
accounting earnings as their most important objective of risk management using derivatives.
Another 7.4% placed managing balance sheet accounts first as a hedging objective.  Minimizing
volatility in cash flows is the most important goal for only a third of German derivative users.
However, another 19.1% of the German firms claim that the cash flow objective is not important
for their risk management programs using derivatives.
                                               
6  See Buckley (1996), p. 167-171, Eiteman/ Stonehill/ Moffett (1995), p. 267 f.
Table 2: Most Important Objective of Hedging Strategy  (by Size)
USA Accounting
Earnings
Cash
Flows
Balance
Sheet
Accounts
Firm
Value
Germany Accounting
Earnings
Cash
Flows
Balance
Sheet
Accounts
Firm
Value
>$6.6b 23.1% 65.4% 0.0% 15.4% > DM10b 37.0% 48.1% 3.7% 18.5%
$6.6 - 3.3b 36.8% 57.9% 0.0% 5.3% DM10 - 5b 50.0% 25.0% 6.3% 12.5%
$3.3 - 1.6b 50.0% 37.5% 0.0% 12.5% DM5 - 2.5b 70.0% 30.0% 20.0% 10.0%
$1.6 - .67b 65.5% 34.5% 0.0% 0.0% DM2.5 - 1b 55.0% 35.0% 5.0% 10.0%
< $.67b 38.1% 42.9% 4.8% 9.5% < DM1b 81.8% 18.2% 0.0% 0.0%
Total 44.0% 48.6% 0.9% 8.3% Total 55.3% 34.0% 7.4% 11.7%
Not Important 5.5% 3.7% 21.1% 23.9% Not Important 10.6% 19.1% 36.2% 42.6%11
The use of derivatives to minimize the variation in the market value of the firm (the present
discounted value of the stream of future cash flows), which is often stressed in the theoretical
finance literature, is not a goal shared by most firms.  Managing the volatility of firm value is a
primary objective of risk management with derivatives for only a small number of US and German
companies (8.3% and. 11.7% respectively).  Again a striking result is that 23.9% of the US and
42.6% of the German firms distinctly denoted this as a non-important goal.
These results raise an interesting question: why do so many US and German managers
ignore the recommendations of the theoretical finance literature?  Looking at the breakdown by
size in Table 2 one is tempted to argue that the results depend on the level of sophistication of
management.  The relevance of the cash flow as well as the firm value objective of risk
management using derivatives increases and the relevance of the accounting earnings objective
decreases with size.  For two thirds of the largest US companies and for almost half of the largest
German companies derivatives hedging is primarily directed to a cash flow objective.  There are no
US and only three German firms in the largest size group that think of cash flow as an unimportant
hedging objective.  Larger companies in both countries are more often concerned with firm value
when designing hedging strategies.
However the sophistication argument is not fully convincing as even in the largest size group
there still are considerable numbers of companies focusing primarily on accounting earnings both
in the US (23.1%) and Germany (37.0%).  Only few of the largest US (7.7%) and German
(11.1%) firms think of minimizing the volatility of accounting earnings as not being an important
goal.  Thus we have to conclude that cash flows and accounting earnings are important objectives
for hedging strategies even in the group of the largest companies in both countries.  One is
tempted to argue that accounting earnings matter to managers because of their relevance to
analysts’ perceptions and predictions of future earnings and because of their relevance in
management compensation.  Both arguments are less relevant for smaller companies that are
typically more often closely held and hence should have less incentive to focus on earnings.
However, from Table 2 we can infer that smaller companies stress accounting earnings more often
as a hedging goal than larger companies.12
Why is there this striking difference in the relevance of accounting earnings between the US
and Germany?  This question is easier to answer when one recognizes that accounting earnings
play a more important role in the German environment.  The function of accounting is not
restricted to provide information
7 but serves an important role in the distribution of dividends to
shareholders and in taxation.  There is a strong link between German financial accounting and
German tax accounting.  Further dividends may only be paid out of accounting earnings; if there
are positive accounting earnings shareholders have a claim on dividends.
8  As a result of those
institutional features there is a strong focus on accounting earnings in all business decisions and
consequently also in hedging decisions.
These results point to a different perception as to the goals of risk management: a greater
focus on cash flow in the US and a greater focus on accounting earnings in Germany.  However,
one should be careful not to overestimate this distinction as both cash flows and accounting
earnings objectives can lead to similar hedging decisions in many situations.
C. Concerns about Derivatives
The questionnaires next identified some areas of possible concerns by management when
using derivatives and asked firms to rate their degree of concern with each issue.  Figure 3
summarizes the results.
                                               
7  This is the prime accounting objective in US accounting. See FASB (1978): SFAC No. 1, par. 33-34: “The role
of financial reporting in the economy is to provide information that is useful in making business and economic
decisions. ... Financial reporting should provide information that is useful to present and potential investors and
creditors and other users in making rational investment, credit, and similar decisions.”
8  See for an overview of the functions of German accounting Working Group on External Financial Reporting
(1995); Ballwieser (1995), p. 1401-1428.13
Many US firms report “high” or “moderate” concerned with all twelve issues raised whereas
German firms express little concern with almost all of the issues. These results give rise to several
questions: Why are US firms more anxious when using derivatives?  Are German companies
ignorant of the risks implied in the list of concerns or are they more confident in mastering those
risks?  The perception by the public is the only issue where slightly more than 20% of the German
companies are highly concerned with another 15% indicating moderate concern.  This is one of the
major issues with the US firms but not the most important one.
US companies express their highest concerns with the evaluation of risks of derivatives,
especially with credit risk (even though only one reported an actual loss on a derivative
transaction), and with liquidity risk.  These are not major issues with German firms.  This
difference can be explained by their more conservative approach to those issues to be outlined in
section VII below.  Other areas of major concern for US companies are quantifying exposures,
pricing and valuation, and monitoring and evaluating derivatives.  These risk management issues
cause some moderate concerns at German companies but again on a much smaller scale.
Another group of important issues for US firms are the accounting treatment, the disclosure
requirements, and tax and legal issues regarding derivatives.  Those concerns reflect the very
Figure 3: Concerns about Derivatives
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lively discussion currently underway on these topics in the US.
9  Because of the discussion in the
previous section one might have expected German companies to be highly concerned with the
accounting treatment and with the taxation of derivatives.  However, only a few German
companies report to be only moderately concerned with those issues.  German GAAP currently
include no specific accounting rules for derivative and hedging but require, on principle, the
application of the general lower of cost or market rule to a derivative and to a hedged item.  There
is a controversy about the extent to which hedge accounting might be allowed with the ruling
majority restricting this to effective micro hedges.
10  Because of the favorable tax implications of
this approach, German companies are not too uncomfortable with this situation.  However, a
considerable number of the largest German companies voluntarily disclose information about their
use of derivatives in their annual reports along the lines of the recommendations of the FASB or
the IASC.
 11  Still only occasionally, but increasingly, they report about an extended use of hedge
accounting for their more advanced macro or portfolio hedging approaches.
12
The current accounting treatment of derivatives in both countries does materially affect the
behavior of a majority of firms.  The accounting treatment alters the desired use of derivatives at
59.5% of the US firms and at 51.1% of the German firms.  Of the 66 US companies whose
derivative decisions are affected by the accounting treatment, 68.2% forego to choose certain
types of derivative instruments, 53.0% reduce the amount hedged, and 37.9% alter the timing of
the hedge.  In comparison, of the 48 German firms whose derivative decisions are affected by the
accounting treatment, less respond by reducing the amounts hedged (29.2%) than by choosing
other hedging instruments (60.4%) or altering the timing of the hedges (58.4%).  This indicates a
greater concern with year-end results consistent with our discussion in the preceding section.  We
will come back to this argument soon.
                                               
9  The discussion nowadays is even more lively and controversial as compared to the time when the 1995 Wharton
Survey was conducted as the FASB moves ahead for a final statement on accounting for derivatives. See FASB
(1997).
10  See Brackert/ Prahl/ Naumann (1995); Gebhardt (1996); Arbeitskreis “Externe Unternehmensrechnung”
(1997).
11  See FASB (1993): SFAS No. 115; FASB (1994): SFAS No. 119; IASC (1995): IAS 32.  For a survey of German
disclosure practices see Gebhardt (1997).
12  See for example the annual reports of Siemens 1995/96, p. 47; VEBA 1996, p. 73-75. Siemens applies a
portfolio hedge accounting approach also in the individual financial statements of the parent company thereby
sacrificing tax advantages.15
IV. Derivatives Usage in Foreign Exchange Risk Management
A. Exposures Hedged
We already outlined in section III.A that the prime area of derivatives usage is FX
management for both US and German firms.  An important question to be considered is how
companies define exposure.  It is common in the international finance literature to distinguish
between translation exposure, transaction exposure, and economic exposure.
Translation exposure results from translating local currency denominated financial
statements of foreign subsidiaries to the currency to be used for group financial statements.  The
exposure depends on the translation method to be used.  For US firms, Statement of Financial
Accounting Standard No. 52 suggests the use of the current rate method for self-contained foreign
subsidiaries and the use of the temporal method for integrated foreign subsidiaries and for
subsidiaries in high inflationary countries.
13  The exposure under the current rate method is given
by the net equity of the foreign subsidiary whereas under the temporal method it is the net amount
of assets and liabilities translated at the current exchange rate.  Changes in exchange rates on
foreign operations thus always cause changes in group net equity and under the temporal method
these change also affect group net income.
For Germany, there is no explicit legal requirement covering foreign currency translation.
The law only requires to report on the method used (§ 313 sec. 1 Nr. 2 Commercial Code).
14  A
proposed statement of the accounting professional organization (Institute of Chartered
Accountants) offers companies the free choice of  translation method.
15  As a result, German
corporate translation practices generally reflect variations of the current-rate method or - less
frequently - of the temporal method.
The recommendation of the finance literature is not to worry about this type of exposure as
it is not a cash flow effect and more specifically not to hedge it.
16  From Table 3, we learn that the
vast majority of US and German firms follows this recommendation.  However, a considerable
                                               
13  See FASB (1981): SFAS No. 52.
14  There is a special rule applying to banks only in § 340h Commercial Code.
15  See HFA (1986). There is deliberately still no final recommendation of the German accounting profession as the
law requires no specific translation method to be used.16
number of US companies do care as they declare to hedge translation exposure frequently (15.3%)
or sometimes (14.1%).  One might be surprised that German firms hedge this type of exposure less
frequently. This result is not inconsistent with the particular emphasis placed by German
companies on accounting earnings as discussed above in section III.B.  It should be noted that in
Germany corporate income taxes and dividend distributions are in principle not based on the
consolidated group financial statements but on the individual financial statements of the parent
company and its subsidiaries.
17
From a theoretical point of view, economic exposure should be the relevant exposure
concept.  Economic exposure may be characterized as the value change of all future cash flows
due to changes in exchange rates or in frequently (50.6%) or sometimes (43.5%). short as the
change in the market value of the firm.  Future cash flows may be based on contractual
commitments or just cash flows from anticipated future transactions.  In this view, transaction
exposure is the part of economic exposure comprising the future foreign currency denominated
cash flows resulting from contractual commitments.  These commitments may either be reflected
“on balance sheet” as receivables or payables or “off balance sheet” as pending commitments from
executory contracts.
The German questionnaire introduced the above distinction between “on balance sheet” and
“off balance sheet” transaction exposures whereas the US questionnaire only asked for the extent
                                                                                                                                                       
16  See for example Buckley (1996), p. 167-171; Shapiro (1996), p. 196; Sercu/ Uppal (1995), p. 525.
Table 3: Exposures Hedged with FX Derivatives
USA Germany
Frequently Sometimes Frequently Sometimes
Contractual Commitments 50.6% 43.5%
      Accounts receivable/payable 77.2% 16.3%
      Pending commitments 29.3% 50.0%
Anticipated Transactions < 1yr 55.3% 36.5% 28.3% 41.3%
Anticipated Transactions > 1yr 11.8% 42.4% 6.5% 40.2%
Competitive Exposures 7.1% 16.5% 8.7% 14.1%
Foreign Repatriations 37.6% 37.6% 38.0% 37.0%
Translation of Foreign Accounts 15.3% 14.1% 5.4% 9.8%
Exposures17
to which contractual commitments are hedged.  From Table 3 it becomes evident that the vast
majority of German firms hedge the “on balance sheet” transaction exposure frequently.  German
firms less frequently hedge future cash flows from pending foreign currency commitments.
Several companies added comments that they always hedge all “on balance sheet” foreign
currency receivables and payables.  The results for the US firms do not appear to be much
different as again more than 90% hedge the transaction exposure from foreign currency
denominated contractual commitments either intra-firm foreign repatriations (e.g. dividends,
royalties, interest and payments on intracompany loans) are a special group of contractual
commitments or anticipated transactions.  Both in the US and in Germany more than one third of
FX derivative using firms hedge these types of exposures frequently while another third does so
sometimes.  This practice implies that hedging decisions are taken from the perspective of parent
company and its shareholders.  It is interesting to notice that the new US draft-statement on
accounting for derivatives now reflects this view and allows for hedge accounting for qualified
hedges on intracompany transactions.
18
The other component of economic exposure is operating exposure.  This is the impact of
current price changes on future non-contracted cash flows.  In turn operating exposure can be
broken into two components: the exposure of identifiable anticipated transactions and the
exposure of unidentifiable future cash flows (competitive exposure).  These are typically
exposures for which firms do not receive hedge accounting treatment for the offsetting derivative
positions.  We first asked firms about their hedging of anticipated foreign currency transactions,
both within the next 12 months (the budget period) and those beyond 12 months.  For anticipated
foreign currency transactions within the budgeting period (next 12 months) a majority (55.3%) of
US firms use derivatives to “frequently” manage these uncommitted future cash flows, while
another 36.5% do so “sometimes”.  For the German firms we observe a slightly smaller percentage
(70%) hedge this type of exposure at least “sometimes”.  Thus, it appears that a large majority of
US and German companies are concerned with the effect of exchange rate changes on the financial
results of the budget year and therefore hedge exposures originating not only from contractual
                                                                                                                                                       
17  See Working Group on External Financial Reporting (1995), p. 99;
18  See FASB (1997), par. 36. In former drafts the FASB took an entity view and would not have allowed hedge
accounting for intercompany transactions.18
commitments but also from anticipated transactions.
19  The hedging horizon for anticipated
transactions is at least sometimes extended beyond one year by many US (54.2%) and German
firms (46.7%); however, the percentage that do so frequently is dramatically lower in both
countries.
When asked about hedging competitive exposure, it is remarkable that a considerable
number of companies in both countries claim to hedge competitive exposures frequently
(US: 7.1%; Germany: 8.7%) or sometimes (US: 16.5%; Germany: 14.1%).  This is an ambitious
hedging concept as it is difficult to quantify such an abstract exposure.
B. Derivative Instruments Used in Foreign Exchange Risk Management
The financial markets offer a broad variety of derivative instruments for FX management
including “plain vanilla” instruments such as forwards, swaps, or futures, “over the counter”
(OTC) and exchange traded options, highly sophisticated structured derivatives consisting of
combinations of derivative instruments (e.g. collars, swaptions), and hybrid debt with embedded
derivatives.  In Figure 4 the bars represent the proportion of users who report each type of
instrument as one of their top three choices, while the percentage of companies who report that
instrument as the most important type of FX derivative are displayed in the right hand side of the
graph.  Figure 4 clearly indicates that both US and German non-financial companies stick primarily
with the simple FX instruments.
20  Currency forwards are by far the most important instruments in
both countries.  Moreover, the use of over-the-counter (OTC) instruments (forwards/swaps and
options) dominates the exchange-traded instrument.  With S companies the use of futures is
considerably higher than in Germany.
21
                                               
19  Some German companies explained in additional comments that they hedge foreign currency cash flows for the
period of the operating planning cycle (typically three to five years depending on the industry).
20  See for an overview of FX instruments Smithson/ Smith/ Wilford (1994), p. 30-42.
21  It should be noted that there are still no currency futures traded at the German Futures Exchange (Deutsche
Terminbörse). The Deutsche Terminbörse started trading an US$/DM-option contract only on January 20, 1997.19
OTC-currency options are more often labeled the first or second most important FX
instrument by US firms.  Exchange traded options only play a minor role at US companies and are
irrelevant to German firms.  This again might be explained by a lack of the availability of such
instruments in the local German futures markets.
In the international finance literature it is often argued that specific instruments are better
suited to hedging specific types of exposures.  For firm commitments, forward-type (variance
elimination) instruments are recommended whereas option-type instruments should be preferred
for uncertain foreign currency denominated future cash flows.
22  Table 4 provides interesting
insights in the instrument choice by type of exposure.  There is a clear preference by most US and
German companies for using forward-type instruments to hedge exposures from contractual
commitments.
The relative importance of option-type instruments increases with increasing uncertainty of
the cash flow exposures.  For exposures from anticipated transactions beyond one year, options
become the preferred instrument with US companies.  However, a surprising result of this analysis
is that a considerable percentage of German companies prefer options when hedging firm-
commitment exposures.  The use of options retains the opportunity to benefit from a favorable
value change of the hedged item because of changing exchange rates - for the price of paying the
                                               
22  See Shapiro (1996), p. 263; Giddy (1985); Giddy/ Dufey (1995).
Figure 4: Preference Among FX Derivative Instruments
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option premium.  An argument put forward in additional commentaries by some German
respondents is that a strategy using options is easier to defend in hindsight discussions.
It should be further noted that forwards are the preferred instruments even when hedging
more uncertain exposures from anticipated transactions.  One can take account of the uncertainty
of the exposures by adjusting the hedge ratio when using forwards.
There is another argument explaining a preference for forward-type instruments: Typically
forward contracts do not impact the balance sheet and therefore are less visible for higher
management or for supervisory bodies, while with options the premium paid or received shows up
in the profit and loss statement. The success of zero cost option products may be largely
attributable to the elimination of this negative aspect of options.
C. Foreign Exchange Risk Hedging Strategies and Market View
It is generally known in international finance that it is difficult to outperform consistently
market expectations as a predictor of future conditions.
23  However, despite this fact, it is well
known that companies often make their hedging strategy contingent on their own view of the
future development of the FX rates. This practice is confirmed by our results in Figure 5, which
examines the impact of a firm’s market view on its use of FX derivatives.  In this case, the figure
displays an interesting difference between US and German derivative using companies.
                                               
23  See, e.g.,  Levich (1979).
Table 4: FX Instrument Choice by Type of Exposure
Most Important Instrument
for each type of FX exposure
USA
Forwards     Options     Swaps
Germany
Forwards     Options     Swaps
Contractual Commitments
Accounts receivable/payable
Pending contracts
Repatriations
Anticipated Transactions < 1 year
Anticipated Transactions > 1 year
Economic/Competitive Exposures
Translation of Accounts
82.5%             7.5%        7.5%
60.0%           28.8%        5.0%
21.3%           31.3%        2.5%
  5.0%           16.3%        2.5%
12.5%           11.3%        6.3%
   69.6%          16.3%
7.6%
   47.8%          20.7%
5.4%
   58.7%            4.3%
12.0%
   47.8%          20.7%
5.4%
   23.9%          17.4%21
German companies are much more inclined to alter the timing or the size of the hedge based
upon their market view. Almost 25% of German firms do this frequently whereas only a small
group of US firms follow such active hedging strategies.  In addition to altering time and size of
hedges, a considerable number of German firms (50.6%) and US firms (41.2%) indicated that they
at least sometimes take active positions based on their market view.  This willingness to actively
manage and even take FX risks using derivatives frequently increases with size for the German
companies whereas no clear size pattern exists for US firms. Such strategies require skilled
treasury people and bank like computer and communication equipment typically available only at
the headquarters of larger companies.
24
                                               
24  In the US taking FX risk “frequently” occurs mostly in the consumer, service and retail industries, whereas in
Germany it occurs mostly in manufacturing industries such as chemicals, electro, machine, metal, mining, and
motors.
Figure 5: Impact of a FX Market View
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V. Derivatives Usage in Interest Rate Risk Management
A. Exposures Hedged
As demonstrated by Figure 2, interest rate derivative usage is a close second in terms of
frequency to foreign currency derivatives. This section compares issues regarding interest rate
derivatives usage across US and German firms.
Table 5 displays the frequency of usage of interest rate derivatives activity across four
common uses.  Overall, the table indicates a more intensive use of interest rate derivatives by
German firms than US firms.  For purposes of swapping from floating rate debt payments to fixed
rate debt payments, fixing a spread on new debt, and locking in a future financing rate, German
firms are more likely to use interest rate derivatives than US firms.  In each of these
circumstances, German firms are also more likely to be “frequent” users of interest rate derivatives
for these purposes.  Only for swapping from fixed rate debt to floating rate debt payments are US
firms as likely to use interest rate derivatives as German firms, but in this case the US firms are
more likely to use this type of swap “frequently”.  The most commonly used interest rate
derivative in both countries is the swap from floating to fixed rate debt, with nearly 89.3% of
German firms and 76.7% of US firms using this instruments at least “sometimes”.  German firms
are also heavy users of interest rate derivatives for locking in future borrowing rates, with over
85% of firms doing so at least “sometimes” compared with less than 50% of US firms.  These
differences in results might be influenced by the historic low of German interest rates during the
survey period providing an incentive to lock in perceived low future interest rates.
B. Derivative Instruments Used in Interest Rate Risk Management
Table 5:  Uses of Interest Rate Derivatives
USA Germany
Frequently Sometimes Frequently Sometimes
Swap Fixed Rate Debt to Floating 10% 55.6% 6.0% 60.7%
Swap Floating Rate Debt to Fixed 10% 66.7% 31.0% 58.3%
Fix Spread on New Debt 3.3% 43.3% 15.5% 52.4%
Lock in Rate for Future Financing 1.1% 45.6% 20.2% 65.5%23
Figure 6 compares the popularity of the seven common forms of interest rate derivatives
across the two countries.  The bars represent the proportion of users who report each type of
instrument as one of their top three choices, while the percentage of companies who report that
instrument as the “most important” type of interest rate derivative are displayed in the right hand
side of the graph.  Not surprisingly, swaps are the most popular form of interest rate derivative,
with nearly 100% of US firms and almost 80% of German firms listing it as a top three choice.
However, it is clearly more popular in the US where 80.0% of firms ranked it as their “most
important” instrument.  In contrast, among the second and third most commonly used forms of
interest rate derivatives, namely forwards and OTC options, more German firms rank them as both
a top three choice and as their “most important” instrument.  In particular, 21.8% and 12.6% of
German firms rank forwards and OTC options, respectively, as their “most important” choice,
compared to 4.7% and 3.5% of US firms.  As with currency instruments, exchange traded interest
rate instruments are not popular among firms, with both lagging structured derivatives for the
fourth most popular form of interest rate instrument.
Figure 6: Preference Among Interest Rate Derivative Instruments
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C. Interest Rate Risk Hedging Strategies and a Market View
Just as with currencies, we asked firms to indicate the impact of their own view of the
market on the timing and size of interest rate hedges and frequency with which they actively took
positions based upon that market view.  Figure 7 shows that the majority of interest rate
derivatives users in both countries indicated to at least sometimes altering the timing and size of
interest rate hedges due to their view of future interest rates.  The tendency to do this either
“frequently” or “sometimes” was consistently larger for German firms (around 90%) than US
firms (70.0% for timing and 53.3% for size).  The inclination to alter timing or size of interest
hedges at least “sometimes” decreases with size among the US companies whereas there is no
clear size pattern to be found for German firms.
In contrast to the FX derivatives, firms in the US were more likely to actively take positions
based upon the market view.  32.2% of US firms indicated that they “sometimes" took positions
based upon market views while an additional 2.2% (only from the group of largest US companies)
said they did so “frequently”.  Although the total percentage of German firms taking positions at
least sometimes was lower (28.1%), a larger percentage of firms indicated they “frequently” took
Figure 7: Impact of an Interest Rate Market View
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positions based upon their market view.  No German company in the smallest size group reported
actively taking positions.  This IR risk taking increases with size in Germany whereas the number
of US companies speculating this way sometimes is larger in the smaller size groups.
25
VI. Derivatives Usage in Commodity Price Risk Management
Given the lower frequency of commodity derivative use among firms, we present only
Figure 8 comparing the popularity of the seven different forms of commodity derivatives.  The
figure indicates that US firms use a broader array of commodity derivatives than German firms.
German firms, it appears, tend to use primarily forwards to hedge commodity risk.  US firms are
more likely to favor futures, swaps, or options for commodity hedges than are German firms.
Whereas both 50% of German and US firms using commodity derivative use forwards as one of
their top three instruments, more than 50% of US firms also report using futures and swaps, with
another 45% indicating OTC options as one of their top three choices.  As for the “most
important” instrument, nearly one-third of German firms cite forwards, compared to only 13.6%
of US firms.  In contrast, US firms’ “most important” instrument is the future contract, with over
40% of firms listing it as such.  Swaps are the “most important” instrument for slightly more than
one-quarter of US commodity derivative using firms while options (both OTC and exchange
traded) qualify as the “most important” instrument for 9.1% of US firms.
                                               
25 Companies that frequently take IR risk based on their market view are to be found only in the chemical industry
and the mining industry in Germany whereas such US companies are to be found in the consumer, retail, and
chemical industry.  To do so at least sometimes is common for 16.7% (electro industry) to 66.7% (construction
industry) in all US industries we considered. In Germany these percentages are smaller ranging from zero
(construction industry and utilities) up to 50.0% in the electro industry.26
VII. Reporting and Control Issues
In this section we compare and contrast the internal policies of US and German firms
regarding their derivative use.  Specifically, we examine the reporting issues, counter party and
credit risk issues and derivative valuation risk measurement issues.
A. Derivative Policy and Reporting
In light of the large-scale derivative disasters in 1994, in most cases where derivatives were
being used for activities other than hedging, it has become common for firms to develop
documented policy statements regarding their use of derivatives to prevent such disasters from
occurring in their firm.
Table 6 reports the frequency of a documented policy with respect to derivatives for US and
Figure 8: Preference over Commodity Derivative Instruments
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Table 6: Documented Policy with Respect to Derivatives
by Size
USA Germany
All Firms 80.4% 81.6%
> $6.6b sales 100.0% 92.6%
$6.6b - $3.3b 68.4% 94.1%
$3.3b - $1.7b 75.0% 85.7%
$1.7b - $667m 86.2% 71.4%
< $667m sales 61.9% 50.0%27
German firms.  Overall the total proportion of derivative using firms with documented policies is
similar across the two countries, at around 80 percent.  Across the size groups there is no
consistent pattern in the responses.  It appears that smaller US firms are more likely to have a
documented policy than are smaller German firms, whereas the pattern reverses as the firms get
larger.  Among the very largest of  derivative users, US firms unanimously indicate having a
documented policy while all but 2 of the 27 largest German firms indicate the existence of such a
policy.
In addition to inquiring about a corporate policy regarding derivative use, we also asked
about how frequently derivatives activity is reported to the board of directors for US firms and to
the board of executive directors (Vorstand) as well as to the supervisory board for German
firms.
26  Table 7 indicates that whereas in the US where a majority of firms tend to report only as
needed to the board of directors, German firms are much more likely to have a set and frequent
schedule of reporting to the board of executive directors and to the supervisory board.  In fact, a
majority of the German derivative using firms reports derivatives activity to the executive board at
least as frequently as once a quarter.  It is not uncommon that those reports are made on a weekly
basis.  The German questionnaire in addition asked for the frequency of reporting to the chief
financial officer (CFO) being a member of the board of executive directors in many instances.  At
least monthly reporting is standard practice with more than 80% of the German derivative using
companies. More than 30% even report daily to the CFO.
                                               
26  The German supervisory board only consists of non-executive directors. Depending on size and industry up to
50% of the supervisory board members are appointed by the workers and at least 50% are appointed by the
shareholders. In situations of conflict the chairman of the board - always a representative of the shareholders -
has a double vote. For a description of the German board system see Edwards/ Fischer (1994), p. 75-79.
Table 7: Frequency of Reporting Derivatives Activity
Monthly Quarterly Annually As needed
     USA
Board of Directors   3.5% 24.6% 21.1% 50.9%
     Germany
Chief Financial Officer 80.2%   7.0%   1.2% 11.6%
Board of Executive Directors 35.3% 27.9% 14.7% 22.1%
Supervisory Board   8.1% 30.6% 32.3% 29.0%28
B. Counter Parties for Derivative Transactions
Another question about corporate policy regarding derivatives use is whom firms decide to
purchase derivatives from or sell derivatives to.  Firms in both countries were asked to rank the
importance of commercial banks (for German firms this was broken down between domestic
universal banks and foreign commercial banks), investment banks, special purpose vehicles (AAA
rated subsidiaries), insurance companies, exchanges, or others.  The pattern of responses
suggested that while firms in both countries rely most heavily on commercial banks (universal
banks in Germany), US firms are much more diversified in the use of alternative sources for
derivative transactions than German firms are.
Commercial banks are the primary source for derivative transactions for 92.7% of US firms
and universal banks are the primary source for derivative transactions for 83.4% of German firms.
18.4% of German firms also indicated that foreign commercial banks were a primary source for
derivative transactions.  US firms were much more likely to indicate investment banks as an
important source of derivative transactions with 79.1% ranking them as either a primary or
secondary source of derivative transactions.  In contrast, over half of German firms indicated that
they never used investment banks as a derivative counter party.  Finally, US firms use insurance
companies and exchanges more intensively for derivative transactions than German firms, with
over 30% of US firms identifying these sources as either primary or secondary whereas less than
10% of German firm indicated similarly.
C. Counter Party Risk
Another issue relating to corporate control policies regarding derivative usage is whether the
firm has a policy regarding the creditworthiness of the counter parties it enters into derivative
instrument contracts with.  To this end the firms were asked if they had such a policy and, if so, to
indicate the lowest rated counter party that their corporate policy would allow then to enter a
derivative transaction with.  The responses to this question for derivatives of less than one year in
maturity are displayed in Figure 9.  For both countries, nearly 90% of firms had a policy regarding
the creditworthiness of derivative counter parties.  However, there is a stark difference in the
minimum credit rating required by German firms versus US firms.  Whereas the
majority of US firms indicate that they are satisfied with counter parties that possess a single A or29
lower credit rating, the majority of German firms indicate that they require counter parties to have
a credit rating of AA or higher.  In response to the same question for derivatives with maturity
longer than one year, the relative pattern of responses was very similar, although the mass of the
distribution was uniformly shifted upward.  In this case, nearly two-thirds of US firms required
counter parties with a credit rating of AA or better while this was the requirement of fully 80% of
the German firms.
Such a greater emphasis on counter party worthiness on the part of German firms is
consistent with their significantly lower concern with credit risk on derivative transactions as
discussed above in Section III.C.  Alternatively, the lower counter party creditworthiness
requirement of US firms may reflect the fact that in the early 1980, there were very few major US
banks that possessed better than a single A credit rating. US firms wishing to do derivative
transactions as part of their general banking activities with US banks had to settle for lower rated
counter parties.  Nonetheless, it is the case that firms in both countries worry more about counter
party risk for longer dated transactions.
Figure 9: Lowest Rated Counter Party for Derivative Transactions
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Figure 10 : Sources of Derivative Values
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D. Measuring Derivatives Value and Riskiness
Over the past few years, US regulatory authorities have begun requiring that firms disclose
information about the current market value of their derivative positions.  In Germany currently
there exists no comparable regulation but a considerable number of German firms voluntarily
provides such information.
27  In addition, many firms value their derivatives at regular intervals as
part of their corporate control over derivative usage.  To examine this aspect of the control
process across US and German firms, we asked three questions.  We first asked firms to identify
the source they used for valuing their derivatives, choosing among several outside sources or in
house software.  We next asked firms how frequently such valuations were done as part of
corporate policy.  Finally, we inquired about the methods firms used to evaluate the riskiness of
their derivative positions. 
Figure 10 displays the responses to the first question.  The general pattern of responses
between US and German firms is very similar.  Firms of both countries tend to use some
combination of derivative dealers, market quote services, or in-house software most intensively to
value their derivatives.  The use of third party experts such as accounting firms or specialized
                                               
27  See Gebhardt (1997), p. 391-397 .31
consulting firms was not common in either country.  There is a slight difference in the pattern of
responses in that fewer German firms use derivative dealers to value the derivatives and are more
likely to value them internally, using either prices from a market quote service and/or their own in-
house software.  Such a pattern is consistent with one of the differences highlighted above in that
German firms tend to be more intensive users of  less complex derivative instruments, such as
forwards, which are simple for the firm to value in-house using market prices.
Table 8 displays the frequency of derivative valuations by US and German firms. In both
countries, approximately 83% of responding firms have a specified frequency within which they
value their derivatives.  However, as might be expected based upon the responses to the reporting
on derivative usage to the Board of Directors question displayed in Table 7, German firms value
their derivative portfolios more frequently than US firms.  Whereas the majority of German firms
with a set frequency for revaluing derivatives do so at least weekly, the majority of US firms do so
on a monthly, or quarterly basis. Just a small percentage of firms in both countries value their
derivative on only an annual basis.
Finally, we asked firms to indicate their usage of a variety of common methods to evaluate
risk of a derivative position, such as value-at-risk, stress testing, calculating option sensitivity
measures such as delta, gamma, and vega, and duration measures.
28  The results suggested that
firms in both countries were equally sophisticated in the techniques they used to evaluate the
riskiness of their derivative positions.  Stress testing derivatives is the most common choice, used
by more than 45% of the derivative users in both countries.  Value-at-risk is the second most
                                               
28  For a discussion of these risk measures see Smithson/ Smith/ Wilford (1994), p. 474-484 and Jorion/ Khoury
(1996), p. 73-233.
Table 8: Frequency of Derivative Valuations
USA Germany
Daily 16.9% 26.0%
Weekly 8.5% 19.8%
Monthly 35.6% 28.1%
Quarterly 17.8% 4.2%
Annually 4.2% 5.2%
As needed/
No schedule 16.9% 16.7%32
popular technique, followed closely by duration methods (for interest rate derivatives).  Option
sensitivity measures are the least common technique with approximately 20% of the firms in either
country indicating use of this approach. For firms that take a more transaction-by-transaction
approach it is not obvious that there are enough benefits to be expected from using more advanced
risk measurement approaches.
VIII.  Conclusions
This paper presents a comparison of the responses to parallel surveys on derivative usage
conducted on comparable samples of US and German non-financial firms.  The results of this
comparison suggest that firms in both countries primarily use derivatives to manage risks from
fluctuating financial prices.  Given the responses, German firms are more likely to use derivatives
than US firms, across all three classes of derivatives examined.  This is consistent with Germany
being a smaller more open economy, leading to greater exposure of its firms to financial price risk,
especially foreign exchange rates and commodity prices.
Notably, the general pattern of usage across industry and firm size is very comparable for
the two countries.  This suggests that the determinants of derivative use are primarily driven by
economic considerations such as activities and firm characteristics and not the result of corporate
culture or other country-specific differences.
In contrast, firms across the two countries differed noticeably on such issues as their primary
the goal derivatives use, their choice of particular instruments in each derivative class, and the
influence of their own view of the market when taking their derivative positions.  Firms in the two
countries differ with respect to the primary focus of risk management with derivatives, with
German firms focusing more on managing accounting results and US firms focusing more on
managing cash flows.  This result is consistent with the greater importance of the financial
accounting statements in Germany (where they also act as the basis for taxation) relative to the US
(where they are purely to provide information to investors).  German firms are more likely to
incorporate their own view on price movements when taking derivative positions than US firms.
Also German firms indicate a significantly level lower of concern about issues related to
derivatives than US firms.  This appears to be partially a result of stricter policies of control over
derivatives activities within the firm.33
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